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This paper presents a model of an economy in which traders use 
social capital to reduce transaction costs. A key assumption is that there 
are two types of social capital: “village” capital relies on personal 
networks and repeat play to guarantee contracts; “market” capital relies on 
third parties such as auditors and courts and is necessary for effective 
market institutions. Village capital is efficient for localized economies; 
market capital allows trade between strangers and greater specialization. 
The model shows how complementarity of social capital can prevent a 
village economy from transitioning to a market economy (industrializing) 
when market exchange becomes more efficient. The model helps 
understand persistent differences in wealth between countries and the 
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  It is increasingly clear that differences across countries in economic performance 
and development cannot be explained entirely by differences in capital and labor inputs, 
factor endowments, and technology. Recent evidence suggests that “social capital” is an 
important missing ingredient. Yet social capital remains an elusive concept, serving as an 
umbrella term for a variety of empirical variables, such as trust in others, density of social 
networks, and honesty of individuals. The process by which it is accumulated and put to 
work remains something of a mystery.
1 
The mystery deepens when viewed at the micro level. Social capital is generally 
assumed to reduce the cost of transacting or cooperating in the provision of public goods. 
The theory of repeated games suggests that cooperation is easiest to achieve in contexts 
where the parties are engaged in repeated interaction and are well informed about each 
other (Kandori, 1992; Moore, 1995). From this perspective, many developing nations 
would seem to be ideal environments for contracting, with their localized economies 
based on kinship and patron-client relations, repeated play, and transacting parties who 
know each other well. And indeed, there are many studies showing how parties in 
developing or transition economics are able to maintain an impressive amount of 
cooperation using sophisticated informal contracts supported by repeated play and 
personal networks.
2 Why are economies that seem to meet the conditions for efficient 
contracting so often poorer than other economies where transacting parties are strangers 
and do not transact repeatedly? 
The idea we propose is that less developed economies may be well endowed with 
social capital, but it is the wrong kind of social capital. We distinguish two types of social 
capital. “Village” capital takes the form of social networks, kinship, patron-client 
                                                 
1 For evidence that the “standard” factors cannot explain income differences, see Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1997), Prescott (1998), and Hall and Jones (1999). On the ability of “social capital” (or “social 
infrastructure”) to account for some of the otherwise unexplained variation see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), Knack and Keefer (1997), and Hall and Jones (1999). For a survey of the 
social capital literature, see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004). 
2 See Greif (1989), Ostrom (1990), and Besley (1995) to list only a few examples. Also see Section II. 
  1relations, and in-depth knowledge about trading partners, and is effective in supporting 
transactions based on repeated play and full information about transacting parties. 
“Market” capital takes the form of knowledge about how to use third party enforcement 
institutions such as courts, auditors, standardized accounting procedures, and commercial 
law; it is effective in supporting transactions between strangers who may not trade again 
in the future. In our view, either type of capital can be optimal in the right environment. 
Village capital works best when economic activity is primarily local, what Besley (1995) 
calls a “village economy”; market capital is essential for transactions between strangers. 
However, only market capital can support the extensive markets, specialization, and 
division of labor that are prerequisites for industrialization.
3 
  This paper develops a theory of economic exchange based on the idea that two 
types of social capital are available to reduce the cost of transacting. In our model, 
individuals choose where to trade—in the village with a known person or in the market 
with a stranger—as well as what type of social capital to accumulate. In addition to the 
benefits of social capital that the individual captures, there are externalities: trades 
between people with the same type of social capital are more efficient, and the aggregate 
level of social capital influences the type of social capital that the next generation of 
people will develop. Because of externalities, a society can end up investing in the wrong 
type of social capital or, to take the case we are particularly interested in, an economy 
based on village capital may fail to adopt market capital even when it would be more 
productive to have an economy based on transactions between strangers. 
  The model helps understand why some countries are wealthier than others, and 
why many countries that were prosperous in the pre-industrial age have found it difficult 
to develop modern industrial economies. A critical factor is the cost of trading with 
strangers. In pre-industrial times, transportation and communication costs were high, 
most economic activity was local, and societies that were able to accumulate significant 
amounts of village capital prospered. When technology improved so that trade between 
strangers was not prohibitively costly, it became optimal to develop market capital in 
                                                 
3 Here and throughout we use “village” to refer to local trades and “market” to refer to trades between 
strangers. This is a convenient shorthand even if not entirely accurate: there may be markets within 
villages, and some trades in villages may involve strangers. 
  2order to take advantage of extensive markets and division of labor. Complementarities 
and externalities associated with social capital make it difficult for societies heavily 
invested in one type of social capital to change to the other. As a result, those societies 
poorly endowed with village capital were the fastest to adopt the market capital necessary 
to support market institutions, that is, to industrialize. In this respect, our model helps 
understand why European colonies in poor, sparsely populated areas (North America, 
Australia, Singapore) have been leaders in the development of market institutions while 
colonies in wealthy, densely populated areas (Mexico, Peru, India) have done poorly, and 
struggled to move beyond local economies (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002). It 
also suggests why the relatively backward states of Western Europe were the pioneers in 
development of market institutions over the last 500 years instead of the relatively 
advanced states of the Islamic Middle East whose commercial relations were supported 
by sophisticated personal networks (Udovitch, 1970; Kuran 1997). 
Our approach to development is driven by two key ideas. The first is that 
institutions are not self-executing—individuals must learn how to use them. It has long 
been recognized that economic development depends on the creation of institutions to 
support market transactions (North, 1990), and institutions play a central role in our 
analysis. However, in our view, pro-growth institutions are not established by adopting 
the right written documents or appointing honest judges and regulatory officials; market 
institutions become effective only when the population at large accumulates the human 
capital necessary to use the institutions. In this respect, we follow Weingast (1997), who 
argues that the rule of law is not self-executing, but requires complementary attitudes and 
actions of citizens. Institutions matter in our framework, but are themselves reliant on a 
society’s social capital, as suggested by Glaeser et al. (2004). 
The other critical idea in our analysis is that there are two kinds of social capital. 
The idea of different types of social capital has not been explored in the literature to date, 
although Krueger and Kumar (2004a, 2004b) use the idea of different types of (regular) 
human capital to explain growth differences between the United States and Europe. We 
came to this idea after puzzling for some time why people in developing countries did not 
have more of the social capital that the empirical literature suggested was so important 
for prosperity. Casual observation suggested that parents in poor countries spent at least 
  3as much time socializing their children and integrating them into family and community 
social networks—which should build social capital—as parents in wealthy economies. It 
occurred to us that although children do develop social capital in developing countries, it 
may be the wrong kind of social capital for market transactions. It is the assumption of 
two types of social capital that allows us to explain why some countries seem to have too 
little social capital without having to maintain that they are incapable of investing in it, 
lack the appropriate personal traits, or simply had the misfortune to be born into a 
dysfunctional culture. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the model and fleshes out our 
notion of two types of social capital, with some concrete examples and evidence. Section 
III analyzes the one-period problem in which the distribution of social capital types is 
given. Section IV adds transmission of social capital to the model, and studies the 
dynamic behavior of social capital. Section V discusses how the model can explain some 








  4II.  THE ONE-PERIOD MODEL 
 
  The economy continues for an infinite number of periods, but we will begin by 
exploring equilibrium behavior within a single period. At each point of time, there is a 
measure one of agents. The agents are identical in all respects except for the type of 
social capital they have. There are two types of social capital: V-capital (for “village 
capital”) that is useful for transactions between kin and other people who are known and 
will be encountered again, and M-capital (for “market capital”) that is useful for trading 
with strangers who are unlikely to be encountered again. Social capital has no effect on 
productivity per se, but the right type of capital allows agents to transact at a lower cost. 
  At the start of each period, a measure m of the population has M-capital. The 
distribution of social capital can change over time but not within a period. We have in 
mind that a period represents a generation and social capital can only be changed across 
generations. As will be seen in Section IV, m is the state variable in this economy. Here 
we take m as given and analyze the equilibrium within a period. 
 
A.  Trading Locations and Payoffs 
 
 Agents  independently  choose a trading location  , either their local village 
( ) or the market (l ), which might be thought of as a distant city. Note that a 
person with V-capital can choose to trade in the market and vice versa. Once agents have 
decided where to trade, they are randomly matched with another agent and a trade takes 
place. The net payoff from trading for a person with I-capital who trades in location   is 
denoted 
l
V = l M =
l
) (l I π , where 
 
   Cost n  Transactio Payoff   Gross ) ( − = l I π . 
 
  The gross payoff from trading in a village is normalized to be 1 and the gross 
payoff from trading in the market is θ. This represents the production side of the model. 
We assume  1 > θ : a market provides more diversity of trading partners, which allows 
better matches between input suppliers, producers, and consumers, and more 
  5specialization.
4 Since we are primarily interested in the relation between social capital 
and transaction costs, we have left the production side of the model deliberately simple. 
In other words, we attempt to explain differences in economic performance that go 
beyond differences in productive factors. 
  We build in more structure for transaction costs. Our structure is motivated by the 
observation that many transactions have a sequential nature in which agents have to 
decide whether to “stand in line” or try to “cut ahead” to achieve a better position. Casual 
observation reveals dramatic differences in the orderliness of lines in developed and 
undeveloped countries: in the United States and other developed nations, people tend to 
stand in orderly lines while waiting for the bus, to buy a ticket, at the post office, etc., 
while in many developing countries lines quickly dissolve into crowding. We think 
standing in lines is an apt metaphor in two respects. First, it captures the idea that 
efficiency requires respect for the property rights of others. The person at the front of a 
line has a property right in that position that the people behind can choose to respect or 
try to abrogate. Crowding a line, in our view, is analogous to stealing an intellectual 
property right, refusing to repay trade credit, misusing borrowed funds, or failing to fulfill 
a contract that is ex post disadvantageous. Crowding causes both ex post inefficiencies 
(direct deadweight costs in the transaction) and ex ante inefficiencies (transactions are 
driven from the market by fear of crowding). A second and less obvious observation is 
that the integrity of lines in developed countries is the result of a fair amount of training. 
Children in the United States are drilled from the age of three or less to stand in lines 
when walking to the playground, to the water fountain, etc. Such training is often among 
the first social lessons for children in any day care or school. We believe this is an 
example of a more general phenomenon: people must develop social capital in order to 
effectively defend their “position in the line.” Enforcement mechanisms—courts or 
kinship networks—are not self-executing; individuals must learn how to use them.  
  Instead of formulating the problem in terms of standing in lines, we could have 
formulated it in terms of whether one party is willing to make an investment. Much of 
our analysis would go through in this framework. However, the absence of social capital 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, traders could have a preference for diversity a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
  6would cause a thinness of markets and an absence of transactions, whereas in our model 
an absence of social capital leads to crowding and market disruption. We believe both 
effects—market thinness and crowding—are important in practice, but crowding has not 
been previously explored, and we see it as a visible problem for many developing 
countries. 
 
B.   Transaction Costs, Standing, and Crowding 
 
  Transaction costs are expressed as the amount of time that has to be spent 
completing a trade. When trading partners are matched, they find themselves in a line, 
one person in the front and one in the back, with equal probability. The time required for 
the person at the front to trade is normalized to zero and the person at the back must pay a 
time cost of t  if he waits for his turn. As will be described shortly, the person in the 
back can also try to cut in front of the other person. 
0 >
  Social capital influences these basic costs in two ways. First, the person at the 
back of the line can attempt to cut in front of the other person in order to avoid the time 
cost t. If the person at the back attempts to cut, the person at the front chooses whether to 
defend the line or he can also crowd. The first function of social capital is to allow a 
person to use social institutions to defend his position in the line. That is, a person with 
V-capital in a village can defend his position by turning to family connections or bringing 
about social pressure on the line-breaker using village social networks. A person with M-
capital in the market can defend his position by turning to courts, regulators, and other 
impartial enforcers. However, a V-person trading in a market does not have the ability to 
call upon the enforcement mechanisms in the market; similarly, an M-person trading in a 
village does not know how to use social networks to defend his position.
5 
                                                 
5 The problem is isomorphic to an alternative scenario that does not involve lines: suppose two parties 
agree to supply inputs of a given quality for a joint venture and to share the returns in some way. When the 
time comes to provide the inputs, exogenous shifts in input prices might make the deal more beneficial to 
one of the two parties. The party in the disadvantageous position (at the back of the line) must decide 
whether to comply with the original agreement, or supply an alternative input of lower quality than the one 
he originally agreed to supply (cut in line). If he does supply a lower quality input, the other person (at the 
  7  Formally, the person at the front of the line may defend his position by paying an 
enforcement cost of   if his social capital is properly matched to the trading 
environment (that is, an M-person can defend in the market, and V-person can defend in 
the village.) Defense imposes a sanction on the line-breaker of  . If the person in 
front chooses not to defend, then the two traders crowd and end up at the front with an 
equal probability. There is a deadweight cost of   associated with the crowding 




x t + 2
1  for each trader, all else equal.) We 
assume that the disruption cost is low enough so that crowding can be attractive,  t x 2
1 < , 
and it is always worthwhile to defend the front of the line when possible instead of 
crowding,  x t e + < 2
1 . Given these assumptions, the person at the back of the line would 
never knowingly crowd a person with the “right” type of social capital. We assume, 
however, that the trading partners do not know each other’s type of capital, so inefficient 
crowding may occur.
6 
  Second, regardless of a person’s position in the line and whether there is standing 
or crowding, there is a fixed efficiency gain when traders have the “right” kind of capital. 
Specifically, we assume that transaction costs increase as the number of people with 
mismatched social capital increases. For example, in a market the lowest cost transaction 
is between two M-people, the intermediate cost is when there is one M-person and one V-
person, and the highest cost is when there are no M-people (that is, when there are two V-
people). Formally, if two people with M-capital trade in the market or two people with V-
capital trade in the village there is a transaction cost saving of y for each person. If two 
people with M-capital trade in a village, or if two people with V-capital trade in a market, 
there is an additional transaction cost of z for each person. When two people with 
different types of social capital trade, there is no addition or subtraction from the time 
cost (that is, this is the benchmark case). We further assume that there is a nondecreasing 
                                                                                                                                                 
front of the line) can try to enforce the original agreement using his social capital or switch to a lower 
quality input himself (crowd). 
6 This is stronger than necessary. Our main results would go through as long as there is some probability 
that the parties do not know each other’s type. 
  8return associated with having social capital that is matched to the institutions of the 
trading environment:  .  z y ≥
  The feature that the return from one person’s capital depends on the type of the 
other person’s capital is one way we capture the idea that we are dealing with social 
capital and not plain human capital. The feature that social capital is specialized to a 
particular trading environment (that is, it is not enough for similar people to meet—they 
must meet in the correct place) distinguishes our approach from pure coordination 
models, like the culture model of Lazear (1995, 1999), and captures the idea that social 
capital is institution-specific. 
 
C.  Motivation for Our Approach to Social Capital 
 
  Our approach to social capital is different from what has been done before in 
several respects. Since the model is somewhat abstract, this section motivates our 
assumptions with real world examples and a brief discussion of related evidence from the 
theoretical and empirical literature. Since this section contains only motivation, the 
formal results of the next section can be understood without reading this section. 
  Social capital in our model facilitates exchange.
7 An example would be two 
people who meet and have the opportunity to trade, but one person’s goods are not yet 
available. Will the person who does have the goods accept a promise from the other 
person to repay at a future date? For example, will a merchant loan seed to a farmer, will 
a bank loan money to an entrepreneur, will a supplier offer trade credit, etc.? 
  What we call “village capital” consists of social networks, especially kinship, 
patron-client relations, and informal agreements within small groups of people that are 
enforced by reciprocity and social sanctions. It can also include less savory practices such 
as contract enforcement by mafia and other protection rackets (Frye and Shleifer, 1997).  
Exchanges between agents with village capital will be less costly because of shared 
                                                 
7 There is a related segment of literature that focuses on how social capital can help solve collective action 
problems, see for example, Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004). 
  9languages, customs, and business practices, and also because the network can be used to 
adjudicate disputes and punish transgressions. 
  There is abundant evidence that this kind of social capital is accumulated in 
localized economies and does improve productivity. To give just a few: Wade (1988) 
shows how villages in India are able cooperate to solve collective action problems having 
to do with water provision and grazing and fallowing of herd animals. Greif (1989) 
demonstrates how social networks allowed Maghribi traders to employ agents in order to 
conduct long distance trade in the Mediterranean in Medieval times. Fafchamps and 
Minten (1999, 2002) shows how traders in Madagascar and other parts of Africa earn 
more when they can tap social networks. Besley (1995) describes the use across Asia of 
rotating savings and credit associations that make use of local information and 
enforcement. More generally, Bates (1990) notes the importance of kinship networks in 
providing financial services in undeveloped economies, particularly banking, investment, 
and insurance. 
  In light of all this evidence, it is surprising to find that developing countries 
generally score low in measures of trust, one of the leading metrics of social capital (for 
example, Knack and Keefer (1997)). We believe the apparent contradiction arises 
because most empirical studies use a “market capital” measure of trust. For example, 
Knack and Keefer measure trust with the question: “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 
A better measure of village capital would ask how much people trust family members or 
people they interact with regularly. Knack and Keefer note that trust measured in this 
way is only modestly correlated with their general measure of trust. This is consistent 
with our view that there are two very different kinds of social capital, and countries with 
a lot of one type may have little of the other type. 
 Market  capital  consists  of knowledge that facilitates transactions between 
potential strangers and parties who are unlikely to transact again in the future. It consists 
of common accounting practices, standardized data collection, use of impartial auditors, 
use of notaries, and reliance on third parties to resolve disputes and enforce contracts 
(courts, patent offices, etc.). Parties who use the same accounting principles, employ the 
same monitors, work from the same commercial law will find is less costly to strike 
  10deals, and easier to enforce their agreements. Contract compliance can be achieved by 
legal sanctions, and thus knowledge of commercial law and how to use courts and 
regulatory agencies is part of market social capital. However, market capital is more than 
just knowledge of how to use the power of government to enforce contracts. Much 
contract enforcement in markets takes place through impartial market forces (MacCaulay, 
1963). An entrepreneur who invests unprofitably will be denied funds in the future by 
other investors after they examine his books; a firm that fails to repay its debts in a timely 
way will end up with a negative credit report from Dun & Bradstreet. To use these 
market mechanisms requires specialized knowledge (such as how to prepare financial 
statements). 
  A key distinction between village and market capital in our analysis is that village 
capital can only support local transactions because of its dependence on personal 
networks while market capital can support transaction between strangers. In support of 
this view, Fukuyama (1995) and La Porta et al. (1997) show that economies with high 
levels of family trust (which we regard as village capital) tend to have relatively small 
firms; large firms, which require contracting with people outside the family network, 
seem to require high levels of trust in strangers (market capital). In the same spirit, 
Johnson, MacMillan, and Woodruff (2002) find, for transition economies, that belief in 
the effectiveness of courts (which we view as part of market capital), makes firms and 
entrepreneurs more likely to try out relationships with new customers and suppliers, 
while having no effect on the willingness to transact with firms that are already known. 
  In our model, the process of industrialization is essentially the process of shifting 
the basis of the economy’s social capital from village to market capital. Industrialization 
entails the development of appropriate capital among the population and the 
corresponding formal institutions, such as constitutions, commercial law, and so on. The 
process is well attested for the development of the Western World after the middle ages 
(North and Thomas, 1973; North 1990). As a more recent example, Besley (1995) 
discusses how informal credit arrangements (hui) were replaced rapidly by banks and 
other market financial institutions in Taiwan as those countries industrialized in the 
twentieth century. 
  11  An essential feature of social capital (as opposed to merely a personality trait such 
as honesty) is that it takes time to accumulate and is costly to create (Glaeser, Laibson, 
and Sacerdote, 2002). Village capital is created by individuals spending time developing 
personal relations. Much of this learning is passive, taking place while children spend 
time with their families or in the community. Village capital is also formed by marriage 
alliances (for example, in parts of rural India it was long the custom for a man to marry 
his niece.) Individuals also invest in village capital by giving gifts, which anthropological 
studies indicate is an important expenditure in my local economies (Bates, 1990). Market 
capital is typically accumulated more formally than village capital, and is more costly. 
Market capital is accumulated when students study accounting and law, and when formal 
market mechanisms are established that enforce trading rules, such as a formal stock 
exchange. Formal education in many countries also imparts a general familiarity with 
market institutions that creates trust in their effectiveness (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
8 The 
accumulation of both types of social capital also depends on the distribution of social 
capital in the economy: a child is more likely to accumulate village capital if he or she 
grows up in a community with dense personal networks than in a house on a desolate 
prairie. 
 
                                                 
8 As will be seen, we do not adopt the view of trust as a trait of individuals. Instead, we think of it as the 
expectation individuals have that others will fulfill their obligations. As such, trust in our model comes 
from the confidence individuals have in the enforcement mechanisms available to them. Trust is then an 
equilibrium phenomenon that emerges endogenously as a function of the type and amount of social capital 
accumulated throughout the economy. For a model in the same spirit as our Section V dynamic model 
except that it treats “trustworthiness” as a personal trait, see Francois and Zabojnik (2002). 
  12III.  EQUILIBRIUM IN THE ONE-PERIOD MODEL 
 
  This section studies equilibrium taking as given the measure of people with M-
capital, m. In Section IV, we study how m evolves over time. The evolution of m turns 
out to be independent of the trading decisions of agents, so we can solve the one-period 
problem given m without explicitly considering the dynamics. The main result shows 
how the equilibrium depends on the stocks of the two types of social capital. One 
interesting feature of the model is that an increase in the productivity of market 
transactions can cause the market to collapse, reducing aggregate income. 
 
A.  Standing or Crowding in the Market 
 
  In equilibrium, all agents choose where to trade (village or market) and how to 
behave when trading (stand or crowd). We begin with the stand or crowd decision. Recall 
that the person in the back of the line does not know the type of capital of the person in 
front so he does not know if the person in front can defend his position in the line. 
Leaving aside the fixed cost of transacting, if the person in front has M-capital then a 
cutter will be punished and his wait time ends up  c t + . If the person in front has V-
capital, the two end up crowding, and the wait time is  x t + 2
1 . Let p be the (endogenously 
determined) proportion of people in the market with M-capital. The person in back will 
stand if the time cost of crowding exceeds the time cost of standing, that is, if 
0 ) )( 1 ( ) ( 2
1 > − + − + + ≡ t x t p c t p λ . Since λ  is increasing in p, there is a unique   
satisfying 
p ˆ
0 ) ˆ ( = p λ .
9 Everyone in the market stands if   because the person is front 
is likely to have M-capital, and everyone in the market attempts to cut if   because 
the person in front is likely to have V-capital. We refer to the situation when everyone 
stands as “market standing” or a “standing equilibrium,” and the situation when everyone 
tries to cut as “market crowding” or a “crowding equilibrium.” 
p p ˆ >
p p ˆ <
                                                 
9 Also . When  ) 1 , 0 ( ) 5 /(. ) 5 (. ˆ ∈ + − − = c x t x t p p p ˆ =  agents are indifferent between standing and 
crowding. Their behavior in this case will be determined by other equilibrium conditions. 
  13B.  Choice of Trading Location 
 
  We first show that an M-person always trades in the market. There are four 
possible situations to consider according to whether the village stands or crowds and 
whether the market stands or crowds. Three of them are obvious: If there is standing in 
both the market and the village or if there is crowding in both the market and the village, 
the M-person is better off trading in the market because of the higher gross payoff in the 
market and because his social capital is better suited for the market. If the market stands 
and the village crowds, he prefers to trade in the market for the reasons just given, plus 
the fact that he avoids the crowding. The less obvious case is when the market crowds but 
the village stands. If the market crowds, then some V-people must be trading in the 
market, implying  ) ( ) ( V M V V π π ≥ . Now  ) ( ) ( M M V M π π >  because the M-person’s 
capital allows him to defend against a cutter in the market, and by a parallel argument 
) ( ) ( V V M V π π > . The three inequalities together imply that  ) ( ) ( V M M M π π > . 
  The fact that all M-people trade in the market implies that none of them trade in 
the village. Therefore, only V-people trade in the village and there is never cutting or 
crowding in the village (the person at the back of the line knows with certainty that the 
person at the front of the line can defend his position). 
  It remains to characterize the trading decision of a person with V-capital. Since 
only V-people trade in the village and it has a standing equilibrium. The payoff from 
trading in the village is equal to the gross payoff of 1 minus the average waiting time 
( t 2
1 ) plus the efficiency gain from trades between correctly matched social capital (y): 
y t V V + − = 2
1 1 ) ( π .  The payoff from trading in the market depends on whether the 
market stands or crowds. If the market stands,  z p t M V ) 1 ( ) standing | ( 2
1 − − − =θ π . The 
market payoff provides a higher gross return than the village payoff ( 1 > θ ) but trading 
takes longer because V-capital is not suited for market transactions. Note that 
0 / > = z dp d V π : the market is increasingly attractive as the number of people with M-
capital increases because M-people make transactions more efficient. If the market 
crowds, the payoff is lower. With probability  p 2
1 , the V-person is punished and forced to 
  14stand at the back at the back of the line (marginal cost  t 2
1 c+ ). With probability  p 2
1 1− , 
the deadweight cost of crowding (x) is incurred. Therefore: 
 







1 − − + − − − − =θ π . 
 
When the market crowds,  ) ( / 2
1
2
1 c x t z dp d V + − − = π . An increase in p cuts both ways: 
with more M-people, transactions are more efficient on average, but the M-people impose 
sanctions when their position in the line is threatened. We assume that  ) (2
1
2
1 c x t z + − >  
so that  0 / > dp d V π : the fixed efficiency effect dominates the sanction effect.
10 
  The payoff for a V-person in the market can then be characterized as a function of 
p. It takes the form shown by the solid line segments in Figure 1. The payoff jumps at   
when the market shifts from crowding to standing. The payoff to a V-person trading in 
the village is flat, indicated by the horizontal dashed line.  For any given p, a V-person 
trades in the market if 
p ˆ
) ( ) ( V M V V π π > , that is, if the solid segment is above the dashed 
line. 
  We now have enough information to characterize the equilibrium conditional on 
m, the fraction of people in the economy with M-capital: 
 




1 z x t /( ) 1 ( 2
1
0 c z y x p − − + − + − − = θ  (the solution to 
) crowding | ( ) ( M V V V π π = ). Then equilibrium takes one of three forms: 
•  E1. If m , then  , the market crowds, and  0 p < 0 p p = ) ( ) ( M V V V π π = . Some V-
people trade in the village and some in the market. 
•  E2. If  , then  p m p ˆ 0 < < m p = , the market crowds, and all V-people trade in the 
market. 
                                                 
10 With the reverse assumption, the agents will have to play mixed strategies for some parameter values and 
characterization of the equilibria becomes cumbersome. 
  15•  E3. If  , then  m p < ˆ m p = , the market stands, and all V-people trade in the 
market.
11 
  In all cases (E1-E3), all M-people trade in the market. 
 
Proof: If   then even if all V-people trade in the market, the market has a standing 
equilibrium, and 
m p < ˆ
) ( ) ( V M V V π π >
p m p ˆ 0 < <
. Therefore, all V-people do trade in the market. When 
,  there are enough V-people to cause crowding if more than 1  of them go to 
the market. When  , even if all V-people trade in the market they do not drive 
the payoff below what they could receive by trading in the village. So they all trade in the 
market and there is crowding. If 
p m ˆ < p ˆ −
0 p m < , then enough V-people trade in the market to 
drive the payoff down to the payoff from trading in the village, that is,   and  0 p p =
) (V V ) (M V π π = . 
 
  Proposition 1A shows that market performance depends on the stocks of the two 
types of social capital. As the number of people in the economy without M-capital 
increases, market transactions become increasingly costly, and at some point the market 
collapses into crowding. There are two types of externalities at work here. First, a person 
with V-capital imposes a time cost on his trading partner than an M-person. Second, 
when enough people with V-capital go to the market, they cause the market to collapse 
into crowding.  
  Figure 2 shows the relation between p and m that emerges from Proposition 1A. 
When there are relatively few V-people in the economy, all of them go to the market and 
m p = . When the number of V-people in the economy exceeds 1 0 p − , only enough of 
them trade in the market to bring  0 p p = ; the rest of them trade in the village. Given this 
mapping between p and m, the payoffs given earlier can be expressed in terms of the state 
variable m, a formulation we use in the next proposition. 
                                                 
11 If  , both standing and crowding equilibria are possible, in which all V-people trade in the market.  p p ˆ =
  16  Proposition 1A shows how market performance depends on the distribution of 
social capital. The next proposition describes how economic performance—combined 
market and village outcomes—depends on social capital. The aggregate payoff in the 
economy is  ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( M m M m m V M π π − + = Π
( V
, where we have used the fact that if there 
are any V-people trading in the market,  ) ( ) V M V π π = . Straightforward substitution 
gives the aggregate payoff in each equilibrium. 
 
PROPOSITION 1B. Suppose the conditions of Proposition 1A hold. Then d  in 
each region E1, E2, E3. 












π π ) 1 ( / − + + − = Π
M V M
. The equilibrium payoff to a V-person 
is always at least as high in the market as in the village, and the payoff to a V-person in 
the market is always less than the payoff to an M-person in the market. Therefore, 
V V π π π < ≤ ) ( ) (  in each region, and  0 > − V M π π . When the market stands (E3), an 
increase in m improves the efficiency of transactions for both type of agents: 
0 > = y dm / d M π  and  0 / > = z dm d V π .  When the market crowds in E2, an increase in m 
in addition increases the chance a cutter is punished and reduces the time spent crowding: 










1 > + / + + − = x t t c z dm d V π , where 
the inequalities follow from the assumptions  ) ( 2
1 c x t 2
1 z + − >  and  . In E1,  z y ≥
0 / / = = dm d dm d V M π π  because the fraction of V-people in the market does not vary 
with m. Then  0 ≥ /dm d M π  and  0 ≥ / d V dm π for E1, E2, and E3. Therefore,  .  0 > dm / Π d
 
  Proposition 1B shows that the relation between Π and m is monotonic: an 
economy always performs better if the amount of M-capital is increased (leaving aside 
for now the costs of acquiring capital). Somewhat counterintuitively, it is not better to 
have more V-capital even when most trading takes place in the village. The reason is that 
village transactions are always fully efficient in equilibrium because only people with V-
capital trade there. The only inefficient transactions are in the market, and a reduction in 
  17the number of people with the “wrong” type of capital there always improves the 
efficiency of exchange.
12 
  The discussion to this point has focused on the parameter configuration in Figure 
1 where the dotted line,  ) (V V π , intersects the solid line,  ) (M V π , to the left of  . 
Another possibility is that the lines intersect to the right of  . This would be the case if 
markets were not particularly valuable, that is, 
p ˆ
p ˆ




PROPOSITION  2. Suppose  ) crowding | ( ) ( M V V V π π >  when  , and let  p p ˆ =
z y p / ) 1 ( 1 1 − − − = θ  (the solution to  ) standing | ( ) ( M V V V π π = ).  
•  E4. If  , then  , the market stands, and  1 p m < 1 p p = ) standing | ( ) ( M V V V π π = . 
Some V-people trade in the market and some trade in the village. 
•  E5. If  , then  1 p m > m p =  and the market stands. All V-people trade in the 
market. 
  In both E4 and E5, all M-people trade in the market, and  0 / > Π dm d . 
 
  Equilibrium E5 is essentially the same as equilibrium E3 in Proposition 1. 
Equilibrium E4 features V-people trading in both the market and village, in both of which 
there is standing. In E4, the market advantage over village production is so small that V-
people lose interest in the market before there are enough of them to cause crowding. 
Otherwise, the qualitative features of the configuration in Proposition 2 are similar to 
those in Proposition 1.  
 
                                                 
12 The p that emerges endogenously in our model could be viewed as a theoretical analog of the measures 
of trust employed in the empirical literature. The increase of GDP with respect to p (= m) implied by our 
model is consistent with the empirical finding that GDP is increasing in market-based measures of trust. 
13 A third case is when the dashed line   intersects the solid line   at the break point  . In this 
case, there is an equilibrium in which exactly m
) (V V π ) (M V π p ˆ
p p ˆ / ) ˆ 1 ( −  V-people go to the market, and they crowd with 
a probability that equalizes the expected payoff in the village and market. The outcomes in this case are “in 
between” the cases in Propositions 1 and 2, but involve technical conditions that offer few insights. 
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C.  Effects of Parameter Changes 
 
Increase in θ . An increase in θ  corresponds to an increase in the productivity of the 
market. It can also represent a reduction in transportation and communication costs 
associated with trades involving strangers.
14  Graphically, an increase in θ  causes a 
vertical shift in  ) (M V π , the solid segments in Figure 1; the cutoff between crowding and 
standing,  , does not change. More V-people will choose to trade in the market if any 
are still trading in the village because   shifts left. A marginal change in θ does not 
change the nature of the market (standing versus crowding) but does increase aggregate 
payoffs. Straightforward calculations show that 
p ˆ
0 p
0 / > Π θ d d  for regions E1-E5. These 
effects are not surprising. 
  But there is a more interesting case. Suppose the increase in θ  is large and 
discrete, say from θ  to θ′, such that the configuration changes from the one in 
Proposition 2 to the one in Proposition 1. Graphically, the dashed line initially (at θ ) 
intercepts the solid segment to the right of  ; there is standing in the market. Then the 
market becomes more productive (
p ˆ
θ′) so that the dashed line intercepts the solid line to 
the left of  . Furthermore, suppose that  p ˆ p m ˆ < —there are sufficiently few people with 
M-capital. Then the productivity improvement will cause the market to collapse into 
crowding. Intuitively, an increase in θ  of this magnitude makes the market so attractive 
that V-people flood into the market, causing crowding.  
  In this case, the improvement in market productivity may be entirely lost to 
crowding. Consider, for example, the case where  0 p m < , so the productivity 
improvement moves the equilibrium from E4 to E1. The payoff to people with V-capital 
does not change because it is tied by the entry condition to the return in the village which 
is independent of θ. Then  )) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( θ π θ π θ θ M M m − ′ = Π − ′ Π , which leads to  
                                                 
14 For example, suppose  ) costs tion  transporta ( − = θ θ , where θ  is the payoff from a trade in the market 
conditional on already being in the market. Then as the cost of traveling to the market falls, the net payoff 
from trading in the market (θ ) rises. 
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1 0 t x p c p e p p y m − − + + − − + − ′ = Π − ′ Π θ θ θ θ . 
 
The first term represents the higher gross payoff for people with M-capital due to the 
productivity increase. The second term represents higher fixed transaction costs 
(0 ) from having fewer M-people meet each other in the market. The last term 
represents costs associated with enforcement, punishment, and crowding. The aggregate 
payoff declines if the productivity gain is sufficiently small. Somewhat surprisingly, a 
higher quality market can reduce the aggregate payoff. This case suggests that 
investments designed to facilitate market exchanges (better roads, communications) can 
make the economy worse off and spoil the market if too few people are equipped with the 
social capital that allows them to trade efficiently in the market.  
1 0 < − p p
 
Changes in c and e. The parameters c and e reflect the effectiveness of enforcement 
institutions. An improvement in the ability of institutions to protect property rights can be 
represented by an increase in c (ability to deliver stronger punishments) or a decrease in e 
(lower cost of using institutions). In the village context, an improvement in institutions 
might include denser social networks and more interdependencies. In the market, it might 
include more competent and honest judicial systems, police, and so on. Although in 
principle it would be interesting to study changes in institutions in both villages and 
markets, in our model punishment only comes into play in market transactions in 
equilibrium so comparative static exercises involving c and e only shed light on changes 
in market institutions. 
 An  increase  in  c has two effects in Figure 1. First it moves the crowding threshold 
 to the left; people are less willing to crowd and run the risk of punishment. Second, it 
shifts down the segment of the solid line 
p ˆ
) (M V π  to the left of  ; a crowding market 
becomes less attractive to V-people. In equilibrium E2, a higher c reduces the aggregate 
payoff (
p ˆ
m dc d 2
1 / − = Π ) because crowding continues as before but punishments are now 
more severe. In equilibrium E1, aggregate payoffs are also reduced by the higher 
sanctions, but there is a potentially offsetting effect as more V-people stay in the village 
  20(0 ). The only case where an increase in c unambiguously increases payoffs is 
when it causes   to shift from the right to the left of m. In such a case, the market would 
switch from a crowding to a standing equilibrium. This case is more likely with a larger 
than a smaller m. This suggests that policies designed to make marginal improvements in 
the effectiveness of punishment institutions are unlikely to reduce the crowding problem, 
and will make the economy poorer, especially if the economy is primarily based on V-
capital. 
/ 0 > dc dp
p ˆ
                                                
  A reduction in e has no effect on   or the payoffs of a V-person, so does not 
affect whether the market stands or crowds. Its does affect aggregate payoffs through the 
payoff to M-people: aggregate payoffs increase in E1 and E2 when e falls. Here a 
marginal improvement in enforcement institutions leads to a welfare improvement, but 




D.  Inefficiency 1: Too Many V-People in the Market 
 
  Trading decisions in the one-period model are typically inefficient. Here we 
highlight the nature of the inefficiency and its cause. Consider a planner who chooses 
what fraction of each type trades in the market and what fraction trades in the village in 
order to maximize  . Standing versus crowding decisions remain the province of the 
individual agents. 
Π
  First, note that the planner will send all of the M-people to trade in the market. To 
see the intuition, consider a transfer of one M-person from the village to the market. A 
transfer that does not affect whether either location stands or crowds increases Π 
because market trades are more productive, and the M-agent is more efficient in the 
market. A transfer that does alter the behavior of the market can only cause a change 
from crowding to standing, which also increases Π.  
 
15 Our analysis is restricted to values of c and e that are already somewhat effective in enforcing property 
rights. If the economy began with institutions that were completely ineffective (c that was so small or e that 
was so large as to make defending the line uneconomic), then changes in c and e would be more valuable. 
  21  Since the planner assigns all M-people to the market, only V-people trade in the 
village, and the village equilibrium features standing. The planner’s problem is then to 
choose the measure of V-people trading in the market, call it q, to solve 
 
  max )} standing | ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( { V q m M q M m V V M
q
π π π − − + + , 
 
where  ) (M M π  and  ) (M V π may involve standing or crowding, depending on q. The first 
order condition (excluding the two points where derivatives are undefined) is  
 
   0
) ( ) (



















π π . 
 
The first two terms are the payoff for a V-person from trading in the market compared to 
trading in the village. Note that this is the only information used by the decentralized 
agents when they make their trading decisions. The planner’s choice is different because 
it also considers the last term, which captures how additional V-people in the market 
affect the payoffs of other agents through a change in p. The term is negative: additional 
V-people in the market reduce p and therefore reduce the payoffs of other M-people and 
V-people trading in the market (regardless of whether the market stands or crowds). The 
point is even stronger at   where the economy shifts between crowding and standing, 
and the derivatives may not exist. Thus, the planning problem assigns fewer V-people to 
the market. Or put differently, in a decentralized equilibrium the number of V-people 






  22IV.  THE DYNAMIC MODEL 
 
A.  Social Capital Accumulation 
 
  In the previous section, we explored the trading decision of adult agents given the 
types of social capital in the economy. We now turn to the evolution of social capital over 
time. We assume that each agent is an adult for one period, during which he trades and 
also guides the social capital accumulation of his single child. Social capital is 
accumulated by a child partly as a result of purposeful decisions of the parent, and partly 
as a result of prevailing social conditions. For example, parents can choose to send 
children to school, after-school tutoring, and other activities that might build M-capital, 
or keep them at home working, interacting with relatives, and engaged in community 
activities that would build V-capital. But parents can only influence the outcome: despite 
the efforts of parents, children may learn by observing others (Bisin and Topa (2003)).  
  Formally, the probability a person acquires type-I social capital is  I φ , where 
 
(1)   ) (m hf M = φ  
   ) ( 1 m hf V − = φ  
 
where  ] , [ h h h∈  is the amount of “time” spent by the person attempting to learn M-
capital. One interpretation is that h is the number of hours spent in formal schooling. The 
value of h is selected by a parent for the child, and we assume that  1 0 < < < h h  so that 
parents cannot guarantee an outcome. Even if parents choose the maximum or minimum 
value of h, there is still a chance that the child will learn the “wrong” type of human 
capital. The function f captures the effect of society at large on the social capital 
accumulation process. We assume that f is increasing, weakly concave, and 
, again so that there is a chance for a person to learn either type of 
social capital even when m takes on extreme values.  
1 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( 0 < < < f f
  23  The social capital accumulation process is an adaptation of the cultural 
transmission model developed in a series of papers by Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (BTV).
16 
The BTV approach assumes that a child is first matched to his parents with some 
probability, and otherwise is matched to a representative individual of the population. 
Our process can be expressed in a BTV form by defining  h d − =1  to be the amount of 
time spent learning V-capital (chosen by the parent). The probability of accumulation is 
then )) ( 1 )( 1 ( m f d d V − − + = φ , where  f − 1  captures the effect of the population at large 
when the child is not matched to the parent. The only difference from a standard BTV 
model is that we have damped the social effect with the concave function f. 
  Finally, we assume that M-capital is more expensive to acquire than V-capital. 
The per unit cost of h is  , and the cost of V-capital is normalized to zero.
17 While w 
can be viewed as a direct resource cost, it also includes the opportunity cost of attending 
school instead of engaging in household production. When there are many employment 
opportunities for children or a scarcity of schools (as in many less developed economies), 
the value of w would then be high. 
0 > w
 
B.  Steady States 
 
 Let  ( I ) m π  denote the one-period payoff of a parent with I-capital who optimally 
chooses a trading location as in the previous section, and let β  be the intergenerational 
discount rate. The Bellman equation of a person with I-capital is: 
 
(2)   )} ( ) ( ) ( { max ) ( m u m u hw m m u V V M M I h I ′ + ′ + − = φ φ π , 
 
                                                 
16 See Bisin and Verdier (2001), Bisin and Topa (2003), Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004), and the 
references therein. 
17 Note that while our agents influence what type of human capital their children have, the quantity is fixed 
and identical for all agents. See Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) for an analysis of the quantity 
decision. 
  24where   is the posited value of m in the next period. The equilibrium law of motion for 





m Φ = ′
The first order condition for h in (2) is 
 




′ − ′ )) ( ) ( )( ( β
 
The left hand side is the marginal benefit of schooling. It depends on the difference 
between the utility of having M-capital and V-capital in the next period, discounted by 
the intergenerational discount rate and the probability that social effects will reinforce the 
effect of schooling in forming M-capital. The right hand side is the marginal cost of 
schooling. The problem is linear in h so the solution is either  h h =  when the inequality is 
, and  < h h =  when the inequality is >. 
  Because we have assumed that the social capital accumulation process does not 
depend on the parent’s type (except through social pressure in the aggregate), both types 
of parents choose the same h for their children. Therefore, the law of motion is simply 
. From (2), u ) (m hf = Φ ) ( ) ( ) ( m m m u V M V M ∆ ≡ − = − π π . Then the first order condition 
(3) can be rewritten in the convenient form 
 




′ ∆ ) ( ) ( β
 
  We begin by characterizing the relatively simple case described in Proposition 2, 
in which  ) crowding | ( ) ( M V V V π π >  when  p p ˆ = . In this case, it is straightforward to 
show that   is continuous and nondecreasing in m, specifically,  ∆ z p y p ) 1 ( 1 1 − + = ∆  in 
E4, and ∆  in E5. Intuitively, since the market always stands, the only 
advantage of M-capital over V-capital is that M-capital produces a transaction gain of y 
when trading with another M-person while V-capital produces a transaction cost of z 
when trading with another V-person, and the former effect is larger than the latter effect 
z m my ) 1 ( − + =
  25( ). Since   is nondecreasing and  f  is increasing, there is at most one value of m 
that solves 
z y ≥ ∆
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Observe that   if  , and 










. if ) (
; if ) (
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m m m f h Φ   
 
  Figure 3 illustrates one possibility. The lighter curves represent  f h  and  f h , 
while the dark curves represent the equilibrium Φ. It is clear that there can be one or two 




PROPOSITION 3. Suppose  ) crowding | ( ) ( M V V V π π >  when  p p ˆ = . Define   and m  to 
solve 
0 m 1
0 ( m f h =  and  1 1) ( m m f h = . 
•  If   then there is a unique steady state with  0
* m < 1 m m = . The steady state is 
stable and all parents choose  h h =  for their children. 
•  If   then there are two steady states. Both are stable. In one steady 
state,   and all parents choose 
1
*
0 m m < <
0 m m h h = . In the other steady state, m  and 
all parents choose 
1 m =
h = h . The aggregate payoff   is lower at   than  .  0 m 1 m
•  If   then there is a unique steady state with  1 m < 0 m m = . The steady state is 
stable and all parents choose  h h =  for their children. 
 
  26  Proposition 3 shows there are two qualitatively different steady states,  , in 
which no parents send their children to school, and  , in which all parents send their 
children to school. We call the first case a “V-capital equilibrium” and the second an “M-
capital equilibrium.” Regardless of the equilibrium, there will be agents with both types 
of social capital because the social capital transmission process is noisy. 
0 m
1 m
  A critical question is what determines which equilibrium prevails. One way to 
answer that question is to identify parameter configurations for which only m  or only 
 are feasible. From Proposition 3, we see that there is a unique V-capital equilibrium 
for sufficiently high  , and a unique M-capital equilibrium for sufficiently low  . The 
definition of   and (3′) lead to the conclusion that an M-capital equilibrium prevails 






β  or a sufficiently low w (and conversely for a unique V-
capital equilibrium). As parents care more about their children and as the cost of 
schooling falls, parents are more likely to invest in M-capital. The possible equilibria are 
also affected by the underlying parameters of the one-period model through  . An 
increase in 
∆
θ  increases  , reducing  , making the M-capital equilibrium more likely.  ∆
* m
  The case where   is particularly interesting because when this holds, 
initial conditions matter. If the economy begins with  , it transitions to the V-
capital equilibrium. If the economy begins with m , it transitions to the M-capital 
equilibrium. Thus, an economy that begins with abundant V-capital can be locked into 
that type of capital. The aggregate payoff is higher in the   than the   equilibrium, 
from Proposition 2. 
1
*
0 m m m < <





  There are two sources of dynamic “increasing returns” in this economy that give 
rise to multiple steady states. First, the likelihood that a child becomes an M-person is 
increasing in the fraction of M-people in the economy due to the possibility of outside 
socialization. Second, the one-period payoff to being an M-person instead of a V-person 
(∆) is increasing in m. The more people in the economy with M-capital, the better it is to 
have M-capital because of social capital complementarity. 
  Proposition 3 and Figure 3 focus on the parameter configuration of Proposition 2, 
in which the one-period model has two possible equilibria. The configuration described 
  27in Proposition 1 (where there are three possible equilibria) is similar, but the transition 
dynamics can be jumpy because of the possibility of equilibrium crowding. The shift 
from crowding to standing at   causes  p ˆ ) (m ∆  to fall discretely—the advantage of being 
an M-person is high when the market crowds because the ability to enforce line position 
is valuable, but the advantage falls when the market stands because enforcement is never 
required. The discrete shift down in ∆ implies that there is no longer a simple cutoff rule 
for the social capital investment decision. Instead, we have (potentially) three cutoffs: 
h h =  when  , 
*
a m m < h h =  when  ,  p m ˆ < ma
* < h h =  when  , and 
* ˆ b m m p < < h h =  when 
, where   and  . The equilibrium transition 
function may jump back and forth between 
m mb <
* w m m a a ∆( ) (
* * f β = ) w mb b = ∆ ) ( )
* * m f ( β
f h  and  f h . Figure 4 illustrates one 
possibility. Proposition A1, stated and proved in the Appendix, characterizes the full set 
of possibilities. 
  Figure 4 displays some of the same broad features as Figure 3. Most important, 
there can be multiple steady states, and when this attains, the ultimate outcome is 
governed by the initial value of m. As before, there are many configurations where, for a 
sufficiently high value of m, the economy moves to m , or, for a sufficiently low value of 
m, the economy moves to  . However, it is also possible for the path to be disrupted by 
discrete jumps. When this happens, the economy will not move smoothly toward a 
particular equilibrium. There is also a cycling region for m  in which 
generations bounce back and forth between investing in V-capital and M-capital. This 
happens when a generation with V-capital and market crowding produces a generation 
with M-capital in which the market stands. With a standing market, the net benefit from 
having M-capital falls, leading the new parents not to invest in M-capital for their 
children. Another interesting feature of Figure 4 is that the steady state can be non-
monotonic in m. For example, an economy that starts with   may transition 
“down” to   while and economy that starts with less M-capital,  , may 
transition “up” to  . These possibilities can occur if the economy begins with social 





b a m m ∈
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*
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  28C.  Development Paths: Industrial Revolution or Stagnation 
 
  The pre-industrial revolution period can be characterized by localized production 
with little scope for trade between diverse agents. The main cause of localized production 
for most of human history was high transportation and communication costs. As 
discussed above, high transportation and communication costs can be represented by a 
“low” value of θ . In this section we study an economy that begins with  1 ≈ θ , and 
explore how the economy reacts when θ  increases. We are particularly interested in 
understanding the circumstances under which an economy transitions to market 
exchanges supported by M-capital—which we call an “industrial revolution”—and when 
it remains focused on less efficient village transactions (“stagnation”). 
  To begin, observe that with  1 ≈ θ , all V-people trade in the village, and the payoff 
from V-capital is approximately equal to the payoff from M-capital:  . Given that 
M-capital is costly, all parents seek to teach their children V-capital. The initial 




1 m m <
 Now  suppose  θ  increases so that  0 > ∆ . The higher productivity of market 
transactions increases the value of M-capital relative to V-capital, strengthening the 
incentive for parents to send their children to school to learn M-capital. For the moment, 
suppose the increase in θ  is modest enough so that the configuration in Proposition 2 
attains. Now some V-people choose to trade in the market, and but not enough to cause 
market crowding. Whether the economy develops or not depends on whether parents start 
to send their children to school. If they do, the economy will transition monotonically to 
, what we call industrialization. If parents continue to emphasize V-capital, the 
economy will stagnate at  . Although the model is somewhat involved, the critical 




PROPOSITION 4. If the gross payoff from market transactions increases from  1 ≈ θ  to 
1 > ′ θ  so that the conditions of Proposition 2 hold, the economy industrializes if 
and only if m .  0
* ) ( m < ′ θ
 
  29Proof: Observe that   is decreasing in 
* m θ  through ∆. From Proposition 3, there are 
three cases. First, if   then there is a unique steady state  . Second, if 
, then there are two steady states. However, given that the economy 
begins at  , it will stay there. Third, when  , the unique steady state is m . 
Only in the third case will the economy transition from   to  . 
0 ) ( m > ′ θ
* m 0 m
1
*
0 ) ( m m m < ′ < θ
0 m 0 m
m





  Proposition 4 leads to two interesting implications. First, whether or not an 
economy develops depends on initial conditions. The lower is the initial fraction of M-
capital, the less likely development will be triggered by any given increase in market 
technology. An economy heavily invested in V-capital (low m) that was prosperous when 
trading was local will find it the more difficult to industrialize than an economy with little 
V-capital. Why don’t parents have their children learn M-capital when market 
transactions become more efficient? The main reason is that they are worried that not 
enough other children will acquire M-capital. This is a concern because socialization 
effects might prevent enough children from learning M-capital even if they are sent to 
school.  
The other implication of note is that industrialization is easier for economies with 
low costs of schooling, w (a low value of w reduces  .) The cost of schooling may be 
high and development difficult, for example, if existing production arrangements provide 
ample opportunities for children to work. Initial conditions probably also influence 
development through w. If, as seems plausible, w is decreasing in m (personal relations 
are easier to build in a world with pre-existing dense social networks), high initial levels 
of V-capital will inhibit development by raising the relative price of M-capital. 
* m
  The analysis so far assumes that the increase in θ  is small enough so that the 
assumptions of Proposition 2 were met. Now suppose the increase is so large that the 
conditions of Proposition 1 hold. So many V-people are attracted to the market that 
crowding ensues. The economy can develop along several paths. One is a smooth 
transition to m : parents send their children to school, the M-capital in the population 
increases monotonically over time, and the market eventually shifts from crowding to 
standing. There is also a cycling path in which successive generations switch back and 
1
  30forth from V-capital to M-capital and the market alternates between crowding and 
standing. Finally, the economy can stagnate at  . The condition for development is 
stated and proved in Proposition A2 in the appendix. It is more complicated than the 
condition in Proposition 4, but maintains the same qualitative features that we 
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D.  Inefficiency 2: Too Little Investment in M-Capital 
 
  Section III.D showed that given a distribution of social capital, too many V-
people choose to trade in the market. Now we consider how the accumulation of social 
capital compares to the optimum. Suppose the planner cannot affect the trading location 
or behavior of individuals when they are trading (that is, whether they stand or crowd). 
The planner’s Bellman equation is: 
 
  W )} ( ) 1 ( ) { max ) ( m W hw m m m V h
′ + − − + = β π π . 
 
The planner chooses the same amount of schooling for every person, and the transition 
function for an individual remains (1). Given the infinite number of people, the fraction 
of people with M-capital in the next period is the deterministic quantity m . 
Therefore, the planner can control the evolution of m through the choice of h. 
) (m hf = ′
  The planner’s first order condition is 
 






when the derivative exists. Condition (5) differs from the private schooling decision (3′) 
only in the term W , which replaces  ′ . The envelope condition is 
∆ > ′ + ′ V − + ′ + ∆ = ′ ) ) 1 ( m f h m m W M β π π , using Proposition 1B. Thus, the planner 
perceives a higher marginal benefit from investing in M-capital than private individuals 
perceive. Put differently, investment in schooling is too low in the decentralized outcome. 
  31  There are two reasons why private investment in M-capital is inefficiently low. 
The first is that private individuals do not take into account that their M-children will 
provide a transaction cost saving to others (and possibly transform a crowding 
equilibrium into a standing equilibrium). Second, they ignore the fact that accumulation 
of M-capital by their children will make it easier for future generations to accumulate M-
capital via socialization. 
  One implication is that subsidies to schooling can lead to more efficient 
development. Similarly, this suggests a rationale for compulsory education in developing 
countries.
18 However, the type of schooling matters: it has to be schooling that increases 
M-capital. Education that teaches how to use market institutions to enforce rights would 
be the right idea. Education in which students invest in community relations, say working 
on community projects, would be counterproductive if it facilitates accumulation of V-
capital. A related implication is that attempts to foster development by encouraging 
development of V-capital (community projects, local governance and decisionmaking, 
etc.) may be counterproductive, particularly if they end up discouraging individuals from 
accumulating M-capital. Social capital based on interpersonal relations is productive, but 
development requires a different kind of social capital. 
 
                                                 
18 Platteau (1994) argues that compulsory national education was key to Japanese industrialization. 
  32V.  HISTORICAL PATTERNS 
 
  A central message of our paper is that high levels of village social capital can be 
an impediment to modern development. Village capital—with its reliance on personal 
relations and social networks—cannot support the trade between strangers and the 
diversity of trading partners that is required for a modern industrialized economy. So 
industrialization ultimately depends on accumulation of market capital. Because of 
complementarities in social capital, however, it is difficult for an economy based on 
village capital to make the switch. Complementarities make people want to have the same 
type of social capital as their potential trading partners. In addition, there is a 
socialization effect: in an economy with dense social networks, children may end up 
accumulating village capital even if parents send them to school to learn market capital. 
So development presents more than a coordination problem. Even if all parents sent their 
children to school, too few students may accumulate market capital to support a market 
economy, making market capital a bad investment in the end. This possibility reinforces 
parents’ hesitancy to send their children to school in a village economy.  
  The view of development that emerges from thinking about two types of social 
capital is the following. In pre-industrial times when transportation and communication 
costs are high, successful economies invest heavily in village capital to support their 
predominantly local exchanges. When transportation and communication costs fall and 
market exchanges become more productive, it becomes efficient to transition from village 
capital to market capital, that is, to industrialize by adopting the transaction institutions of 
markets. Economies that begin without dense social networks and other investments in 
village capital will be the first to develop. Economies with large investments in village 
capital will find it difficult to develop until the productivity of market exchanges 
becomes very large or the cost of acquiring market capital falls. Undeveloped or 
developing economies will appear to be excessively reliant on local transactions, and 
their markets will be plagued with crowding and a failure to support market institutions 
such as property rights.  
 
 
  33A.   Reversal of Fortune in European Colonies 
 
  Our model can help explain some of the broad stylized facts of economic 
development. One important pattern is the reversal of fortune amount European colonies 
over the last 500 years, documented by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002). 
Colonies established in areas that were prosperous circa 1500, such as the lands 
controlled by the Aztecs and Incas in the Americas, and India, failed to modernize and 
were relatively poor by the end of the twentieth century. In contrast, colonies established 
in poor and sparsely populated areas, such at North America, Australia, and Singapore, 
were among the first to industrialize and became some of the richest nations. In our view, 
the failure of the rich colonies to develop was partly a result of their pre-industrial 
reliance on village capital. Our model suggests that a dense village economy with a long 
history, such as might be found in India, for example, would find it difficult to 
accumulate market capital, while a sparse, relative new economy, such as scattered farms 
in the United States, would find the transition relatively easy.
19 
 
B.  Rise of the Western World 
 
  Our model also suggests a way to understand another historical pattern. One of 
the biggest mysteries in economic development is why modern market institutions and 
industrialization emerged in the western world and not the Middle East. Modernization 
proceeded over several centuries and involved a variety of innovations in law, banking, 
finance, and corporate organization. When modern development began several centuries 
ago, the feudal states of Western Europe were much poorer and less developed than the 
Islamic Middle East, particularly the Ottoman Empire. Casual intuition suggests that the 
Islamic states would have been the more likely candidates to modernize.  
                                                 
19 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) suggest the reversal was caused by the adoption of different 
political institutions in rich and poor colonies, an explanation not inconsistent with ours. However, while 
they link the adoption of institutions to the availability of opportunities for colonists to extract wealth, we 
emphasize the difficulty of converting an large existing stock of village social capital. 
  34  In our view, it was the very success of the Islamic states in the Middle Age that 
made it difficult for them to modernize because economic success in pre-industrial times 
required significant investments in village capital. These large investments in village 
capital made it difficult to convert to market capital. Thus, our model provides a 
resolution to a “paradox” observed by a leading historian of medieval Islam (Udovitch, 
1979, p. 273): 
 
“The very factors—status and personal-social relations—which assured 
the smooth and successful functioning of credit and merchant banking 
activities in the Islamic Mediterranean world during most of the medieval 
period, effectively prevented their growth, elaboration, and development 
into independent, stable organizational forms. Given the slowness and 
unpredictability of communications between geographically distant 
locations, and given the sheer physical and psychological limitations on 
individual social intercourse, the scale of economic activities was 
necessarily restricted to numerous small, even intimate, circles. The 
possibility of expansion into a larger, more cohesive structure was 
precluded by the comparatively narrow social basis on which economic 
life was conducted.” 
 
  North (1998) argues that another factor responsible for the rise of Western Europe 
was the fragmentation of political power between numerous states.
20 Unlike the Islamic 
Middle East, which was dominated by the Ottoman Empire, European states were subject 
to a great deal of competition from other governments. This competitive environment 
                                                 
20 North (1988, pages 20-21) also observes the limitations arising from the institutions used to support 
Islamic trade: “The traders from the Islamic world developed in-group social communications networks to 
enforce collective action which, while effective in relatively small homogeneous ethnic groups, do not lend 
themselves to the impersonal exchange that arises from the growing size of markets and diverse ethnic 
traders.” He suggests the institutions were driven by pre-existing “beliefs” regarding the role of individuals 
and groups, while we view them as the outcome of deliberate forward-looking human capital investment 
decisions. 
  35brought forth a variety of institutional innovations, some of which were designed to allow 
the state to raise funds. Our model suggests that fragmentation may have had another 
benefit. It made it more likely that trade would take place with people of other cultures 
(different languages, different political systems, etc.) This may have led Western 
Europeans to begin with higher levels of M-capital, much like today Europeans may 
invest more in capital that allows them to trade with people outside their own country 
(say, by learning a second language). For example, Italian bankers developed skills that 
allowed them to move capital across national borders at relatively low cost. The same 
logic suggests that high levels of immigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
may have aided development of market capital. 
 
C.  Post-Communist Transition Economies 
  
  Development is also a critical issue for the post-communist nations of Eastern 
Europe and Asia. Many of these nations are already industrialized but lack many of the 
institutions necessary to support market economies. In terms of our model, these 
economies began as primarily V-capital economies: personal relations were critical for 
economic exchange under communism, not knowledge of commercial law, courts, and 
the like. In the short run, the creation of relatively free markets would be expected to 
have two effects. First, it will cause “crowding” in the market as V-people enter market 
but do not know how to use market institutions. In practical terms, this means that 
property rights will be insecure and contracting will be cumbersome. Second, some V-
agents will continue to trade using V-capital to support their transactions. One 
manifestation of this would be contract enforcement by organized crime groups. The use 
of V-capital by criminal groups to support exchanges can result in output increases and 
even the appearance of order in some cases (much like Chicago was seen by many to run 
efficiently under the patronage system of the first Mayor Daley). V-capital is ultimately 
limited in the amount of specialization it can support, however, because of its grounding 
in small, homogeneous groups. So while a transition economy can make initial progress 
based on its old V-capital, the largest gains will accrue in the longer run when people 
have invested in enough market capital to support market institutions. Our analysis thus 
  36agrees with the conventional view that transition economies must construct market 
institutions, except that we would add that functional market institutions will be difficult 
to sustain until enough M-capital has been accumulated. Moreover, our analysis points to 




  37VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
  A flourishing empirical literature shows that economic development is related to 
social capital and adoption of market institutions such as rule of law. Yet the evidence 
raises the question why some countries and not others have managed to accumulate social 
capital and adopt the right institutions. Why do poor countries seem to have so little 
social capital in aggregate, even though theory suggests they are well-positioned to have 
it, and micro studies show they often do have it? Why have some countries been able to 
adopt the right institutions for industrialization while others seem trapped in village 
economies? 
  This paper provides a theory of development that offers an answer to these 
questions. The theory is grounded in two ideas that have not been emphasized in the 
literature. The first idea is that there are two types of social capital, and they tend to be 
substitutes for each other: “village” social capital takes the form of personal relations and 
social networks and is effective in supporting transactions between people in the same 
network; “market” social capital takes the form of knowledge about commercial law, 
courts, and other third party institutions, and is effective in supporting transactions 
between strangers. The second idea is that institutions are not self-enforcing—individuals 
must develop skills and knowledge to use them. Industrialization, in our view, requires 
the adoption of market institutions such as rule of law, but those institutions in turn can 
only be sustained if the population has acquired the requisite social capital.  
  Our answer for why poor countries seem to have so little social capital is that 
existing research tends to measure market social capital, such as trust in strangers. Our 
analysis and a great deal of micro evidence suggests that these countries would do much 
better if social capital were measured in terms of kinship and other personal networks, 
patron-client relations, and so on. The development challenge for these countries is to 
transition from village capital to market capital.  
  As for why some countries have been more successful than others at adopting 
market institutions, we suggest that part of the answer lies in understanding why some 
countries have been better at adopting market social capital—such capital is required to 
support market institutions. Our model shows that externalities in the accumulation and 
  38use of social capital make it difficult for economies to convert from one type of social 
capital to the other type. When transportation and communication costs fall, making 
industrialization an option, those countries well-endowed with village capital find it the 
hardest to adopt market institutions. Economies without dense social networks find it 
easiest to industrialize. This picture is consistent with evidence of a reversal of fortune 
among European colonies over the last 500 years, and suggests why market institutions 
and industrialization had their origins in the relatively backward states of medieval 
Europe instead of the initially more prosperous and advanced Islamic Middle East.  
  The desire to present our story in a fairly parsimonious way has led us to omit 
some factors that we think are important for development. Chief among them is politics. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) and Glaeser et al. (2004) among others have 
argued persuasively that political decisions play a role in economic growth. One way to 
view our model is roughly along the lines suggested by Glaeser et al. (2004): social 
capital provides the opportunity set for development, but political leaders can choose a 
point in the interior of the set. It is also possible that the political decisions themselves are 
induced by social capital, that is, politics over the long run could be just a veil. 
Nevertheless, by providing a detailed theoretical framework incorporating social capital 
and institutions, we think our approach may be a useful addition to the toolkit used to 
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PROPOSITION A2. If the gross payoff from market transactions increases from  1 ≈ θ  to 
1 > ′ θ  so that the conditions of Propositions 1 and A1 hold, the economy 
industrializes if and only if   or  .  0
* ) ( m mb < ′ θ 1
*
0
* ) ( ˆ ) ( m m p m m b a < ′ < < < ′ θ θ
  40 
Proof: From Proposition A1, if the conditions hold there is a unique steady state m . If 
neither of the conditions hold then either there is a unique steady state  , there are two 
steady states, or there is no steady state. If there are two steady states, the economy will 
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FIGURE 1. PAYOFF TO A PERSON WITH V-CAPITAL 
 
The figure shows the payoff to a person with V-capital as a function of p, the fraction of 
people with M-capital in the market. The solid line segments show the payoff from 
trading in the market. The dashed line is the payoff from trading in the village. E1-E3 are 
the three equilibria described in Proposition 1A. 
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FIGURE 2. RELATION BETWEEN NUMBER OF PEOPLE WITH M-CAPITAL IN THE 
POPULATION (m) AND IN THE MARKET (p) 
 
The figure shows the equilibrium relation between the fraction of people with M-capital 
in the economy and in the market for the parameter configuration of Figure 1 and 
Proposition 1. The 45 degree line is shown emanating from the origin. 
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FIGURE 3. SOCIAL CAPITAL TRANSITION FUNCTION 
 
The figure shows the transition function for social capital ( m m ′ → ) for the parameter 
configuration described in Proposition 2. The two concave curves are the transition 
functions conditional on low ( f h ) and high ( f h ) social capital investment. The 
equilibrium transition function is shaded. The market equilibrium is E4 to the left of  , 
and E5 to the right of  , as defined in Proposition 3. 
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FIGURE 4. SOCIAL CAPITAL TRANSITION FUNCTION WHEN THE MARKET SOMETIMES 
CROWDS 
 
The figure shows the transition function for social capital ( m m ′ → ) for the parameter 
configuration described in Proposition 1. The two concave curves are the transition 
functions conditional on low ( f h ) and high ( f h ) social capital investment. The 
equilibrium transition function is shaded.  
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